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Are Human Rights Good for
International Business?
Anthony D "Amato*

When I take up the Nuremberg cases in my class in International
Law, I find it quite difficult to convey to the students how radical those
proceedings appeared to be in 1947. At that time, the contention that
there should be individual accountability under international law
seemed to constitute an unfounded and dangerous precedent. How
could political leaders be made personally responsible for acts of state
such as instituting a war (even an "aggressive" war) or engaging in
wholly internal policies (the "final solution" against Jews and other minorities of their own citizens)? Indeed, the Nuremberg result seemed
somewhat unprincipled to my teachers when I went to law school in the
late 1950's. But today's students, an entirely new generation, find the
Nuremberg decisions unremarkable. Of course, they say, the Nazi
leaders were criminally guilty of mass murder and should not have
been able to hide behind the instrumentality of the state or government.
As the Nuremberg result settles into commonplace international
law, we can appreciate the great change that it wrought in the fabric of
that law. The previous state system symbolized in the term
internationallaw changed to a conception of world law which includes
individuals as well as states, and gives those individuals rights as well
as duties. In 1947, the Soviet Union, which was by far the most aggressive of the victorious allies in demanding execution of all Nazi Party
members, perhaps least realized the radical nature of the precedent
they were setting at Nuremberg-that in holding individuals responsible under international law, the concept of collectivity that forms the
basis of Soviet Marxism tended to be undermined. Of course Stalin
probably did not care; he was himself quite immune from the reach of
law, despite his genocidal purges of Soviet citizens in the 1930's. But
Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Executive Director, World Habeas Corpus.
A.B., 1958, Cornell University; J.D., 1961, Harvard University; Ph.D., 1968, Columbia University.
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the precedent he helped create at Nuremberg survived him. Its legacy
is in part reflected by the sharp, hostile reactions of Soviet leaders
whenever accusations are made against them that they are engaged in
human rights violations within the Soviet Union or in satellite nations.
The increasing sensitivity of the human rights issue attests to its perceived relevance in international law and international politics.
The shift of emphasis in international law from collectivity to individuality seems to be accelerating. President Carter's revealing remark
that human rights is the "soul" of American foreign policy, and Pope
John Paul II's espousal of the cause of human rights, signify that it is
an idea whose time has come. Not surprisingly, the military-industrial
complex in the United States has been one of the slowest to absorb the
idea. Support for the Shah of Iran, to take the most recent example,
was urged most vehemently by the Pentagon, major banks, and arms
manufacturers, in the teeth of evidence that the Shah's brutal repression of Iranian dissidents and his total mental imperviousness to the
concept of human rights was not only morally intolerable but also potentially explosive within Iran. The resulting revolution in that country, taking the military-industrial complex by surprise, resulted in
many cases of total loss to American financial and commercial interests
that had been doing business with the Shah of Iran.'
Yet perhaps multinational investments were attracted to Iran because the Shah's regime seemed strong and stable. Could it be possible
that the logic of international commerce is inconsistent with the disruptive ideas associated with the term "human rights"? We need only recall that fascism was the theory of the completely strong and stable
state, one inwhich the government was indeed transformed into a business corporation. But even in today's rhetoric, international business
persons might fear the "revolution of rising expectations" suggested by
the various human rights conventions as posing a latent threat to multinational corporations. For instance, the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, recently signed by President Carter and sent
to the Senate for ratification, 2 contains not only the right to work but
also the right to fair wages, equal pay for equal work, equal work conditions for women and men, and "rest, leisure and reasonable limita1 See, e.g., Business losses in Iran may get much worse, Chi. Tribune, Feb. 23, 1979, § 5, at 7,

col. 2.

2 President Carter signed the Covenant on October 5, 1977. See Remarks on SigningInterna-

tional Covenant on Human Rights, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1488 (Oct. 5, 1977). He
submitted it to the Senate for ratification on February 23, 1978. See 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 395 (Feb. 23, 1978). More recently, President Carter urged ratification of this Covenant in a
presidential proclamation. See Proc. No. 4609, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,009 (1978).
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tion of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as
remuneration for public holidays. ' 3 Also included is the "right of everyone to an adequate standard of living," including food, clothing,
and housing. 4 One of the most articulate, though less well-known, documents expressive of the third-world consensus on economic rights is
the Cocoyoc Declaration of October 12, 1974. 5 Consider this passage
from that document:
Our first concern is to redefine the whole purpose of development. This
should not be to develop things but to develop man. Human beings have
basic needs: food, shelter, clothing, health, education. Any process of
growth that does not lead to their fulfillment--or, even worse, disrupts
them-is a travesty of the idea of development. We are still in a stage
where the most important concern of development is the level of satisfaction of basic needs for the poorest sections of the population in society.
The primary purpose of economic growth should be to ensure the improvement of conditions for these groups. A growth process that benefits
only the wealthiest minority and maintains or even increases the dispari-6
ties between and within countries is not development. It is exploitation.

In the present essay I shall attempt to examine briefly whether any
apparent first blush inconsistency between multinational investment
and human rights is tenable. I shall consider four arguments. The first
and simplest argument I will raise is one of enlightened self-interest.
Second, I will attempt to examine what kinds of "rights" are being discussed in the term "human rights" and consider their implications for
business investment. Third, I will take a closer look at the already
mentioned conflict between human rights and Marxist collectivism.
And finally, perhaps the least perceived but potentially the most impor3 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, entered in force Jan. 3,
1976, arts. 6 & 7, G.A. Res. 2200 (Annex), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 50, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967).
4 Id. art. II. Of course, the term "human rights" most prominently includes political and
civil rights, such as the right to a fair trial, habeas corpus, prohibition against ex post facto laws,
freedom from discrimination, and prohibition against torture and cruel or degrading punishment.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. 810, at 71 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered inforce Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200
(Annex), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967). I am stressing in the
present essay so-called "economic rights" since they give rise to the more difficult arguments in
light of business interests. If my argument is,correct with respect to "economic rights," it should
be an afortioricase with respect to "political rights."
5 For the text of this declaration, see BEYOND DEPENDENCY 170 (G. Erb and V. Kallab eds.
1975) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND DEPENDENCY].

Although the Cocoyoc Declaration was

drafted by a group of individuals speaking only for themselves, included were prominent social
scientists, natural scientists, and United Nations officials, chaired by Lady Barbara Ward Jackson,
in a symposium organized by the United Nations Environment Program and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, in close cooperation with the government of Mexico.
6 Id. at 173.
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tant issue, I will attempt to distinguish two strands that have become
thoroughly confused in the human-rights rhetoric-the rights of individuals and national claims to self-determination-and the implications of that distinction to multinational business.
SELF-INTEREST

Left to itself, business is apolitical and perhaps amoral. 7 The business goal of profit maximization encourages efficiency within the company structure but does not directly address the human needs of
suppliers, workers, and consumers. Yet indirectly, as Robert Owen
among others argued in the nineteenth century, human needs should
figure into profit maximization: the more fully a worker's needs are
provided for, the more loyal and efficient the worker becomes. 8 In this
sense, increasing the worker's standard of living-and concomitantly
the worker's stake in industrial success-should be in the general interest of the business community.
But the human rights issue today is more than a plea for calculation of long run self-interested profitability, as Owen might have argued. Rather, the increasing aspiration for human rights, reflected in
the previously quoted Cocoyoc Declaration, is one that multinational
business can only ignore at its own peril. For instance, the dictatorial
regimes in Cuba, Chile, and Iran seemed eminently stable and businesslike until suddenly they were toppled by internal revolutions. Such
revolutions seem increasingly likely in a world where the human rights
idea has "caught on," in countries where the government ignores the
human rights of the citizenry and allows too great an economic disparity between the favored elite and the masses. And when such revolutions occur, investment losses can be total. Indeed it may already have
become more prudent for a multinational corporation to open up a new
plant in a country that has a reasonable tax on profits and makes sure
that the tax benefits the people, than to invest in a country that has an
invitingly low tax but ignores the welfare of its citizenry. Although the
return on investment in the former case may be less dramatic initially,
it might continue for a long time; the latter case, on the other hand,
could at any moment explode in revolution and total confiscation. 9
7 According to Irving Kristol, "It is, in my opinion, as absurd to praise the profit motive-i.e.,
economic action based on self-interest-as it is to condemn it. The human impulse to such action
is, like the sexual impulse, a natural fact." No CheersforProfit Motive, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1979,
at 18, col. 4.
8 See R. OWEN, A NEw VIEW OF SOCIETY AND OTHER WRITINGS (G. Cole ed. 1927). Robert Owen (1771-1858) was a very successful businessman as well as a philosopher.
9 The same calculation should apply to foreign policy. The Dulles-Kissinger approach that
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Hence, in terms of self-interest, international business must become in-

creasingly realistic about the implications of what has seemed to many
to be a "soft" issue, namely, the issue of human rights.
NATURE OF THE "RIGHTS"

Some observers have asserted that "human rights" such as the
right to food, clothing, housing, medical care, and education, cannot be
taken seriously since, unlike typical rights such as those found in the
Bill of Rights, the so-called human rights require positive acts by others
in order to be actualized. For example, the right to food depends upon
farmers producing the food and shippers transporting the food to the
claimant. The right to medical care requires that doctors be available
and willing to provide it. In contrast, rights found in the Bill of Rights,
such as freedom of speech and religion, and the right to due process of
law, seem to exist as present realizable claims. Thus, Joel Feinberg
contrasts human rights with actual rights, and says that
when manifesto writers speak of them [human rights] as if already actual
rights, they are easily forgiven, for this is but a powerful way of expressing the conviction that they ought to be recognized by states here and
now as potential rights and consequently as determinants of present aspirations and guides to present policies.' 0

But the contrast suggested by Professor Feinberg tends to be misleading. Every right, whether a human right or a Bill-of-Rights right, only
makes sense if there is a corresponding duty. It Freedom of speech and
religion imposes upon others the duty not to interfere with the exercise
emphasized personal friendships and commitments with national leaders, resulting in military
alliances with dictatorial and repressive regimes, can result in enormous losses when these regimes
are toppled. The new human rights approach, on the contrary, holds the promise of forging
longer lasting ties with the peoples of foreign countries. In addition, it tends to create a world
environment compatible with American values in which the United States may feel more secure.
The Dulles-Kissinger rhetoric that we "need" military alliances with foreign governments has
been persuasively advertised and sold within the United States, but apart from some segments of
the business community which stand to gain directly from that program (arms manufacturers and
bankers, for instance), the rhetoric has not persuaded most upon careful analysis. Our present
nuclear stockpile-enough to incinerate the rest of the world several times over-is a more reliable deterrent and safeguard for our national security than nuclear weapons and missiles in the
hands of foreign governments who have paper commitments to us.
Nor do we need their territories as "bases" for our missiles. Our nuclear submarines, under
our direct control and at any given time dispersed under the oceans of the world, are all the
"bases" we need. In addition, missile sites within the United States can reach any target on the
planet with incredible accuracy.
10 Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4 J. VALUE ENGINEERING 255 (1970).
11 See Hohfield, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913). Sometimes duties are addressed to particular persons (e.g., to the courts in
the due process example) or to an indefinite class (e.g., to all who are required to give food to a
starving person). Professor Feinberg notes the latter possibility in a free speech example but does
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of that freedom. The right to due process of law places upon courts
and governmental officials the duty to take positive steps to provide
due process to the claimant. Similarly, the right to work places upon
others the duty to provide the work.
But here is where careful consideration is needed. Just as the right
to speak implies the right to remain silent, so too the right to work
implies the right not to work and the right to a paid vacation implies
the right to skip that vacation. Let us analyze two of the human
rights-the right to food and the right to work. If I am a poor farmer
(and sixty-five per cent of the world's workers are peasant farmers existing in a subsistence economy),' z I have the right to grow food for
myself and my family or not to do so. I have the right to eat or not to
eat, to work or not to work. Of course, at the subsistence level, these
rights seem rather academic; surely I will work and naturally I will eat
the food I produce. But now suppose I am capable of producing more
food than I need. And suppose further that there is another person,
perhaps in another country, who is starving and asserts a "right to
food." If the surplus food that I can produce with my labor is enough
to save that other person from starving, he might claim that he has a
right to that food. But what, then, of my right not to work? Must I be
coerced into working extra hours so that I can produce surplus food to
feed someone else? If so, then my right to work is a sham, for in fact I
am being forced to work. To be sure, I might recognize a moral right
of that other person to some portion of my excess labor, but I would
want to know more about that other person-is he simply being lazy, or
is he working as hard as he physically can but with poor soil or in a
poor climate? If he is simply lazy, I feel a lesser moral obligation to
work long extra hours to feed him. And in any event, the extent to
which I feel a moral obligation is a matter of my own judgment. I do
not want to be coerced by the government into working extra hours so
that the product of my extra labor can be distributed free to others. Or
I could make a different argument which results in the same conclusion. I could work only the "extra" hours and have all the food I produce be distributed to others, leaving nothing for myself. Then I could
claim that I, too, have a right to food, and therefore the food that others
produce should be distributed to me.
In short, a universal system of human rights results in contradiction if the corresponding duties can only be achieved by coercion. This
not appear to carry through its general implications. See J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL

PHILOSOPHY

(1973).
12 Ferguson, InternationalHuman Rights, HARv. L. ScH. BULL., Winter 1979, at 16, 18.

95
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conclusion has enormous implications for the free enterprise system.
For the poor farmer is perfectly willing to produce excess food if he can
trade it for other desired goods that he cannot efficiently produce for
himself. For example, if in one year I can produce a thousand dollars'
worth of surplus wheat, I would do so if I can sell that wheat
and--even if the government takes half of the money for taxes-use the
after-tax income to buy a television set.13 The television set makes the
extra labor worthwhile, and in turn provides my surplus wheat to the
entrepreneurs who designed the television set and the workers who
constructed it. In sum, this simple example indicates that only through
a free market mechanism can human rights be universalized. Any
other system so far devised seems to require, to some degree, human
slavery. Both political extremes of fascism and communism require
forced labor to meet distributive ends fashioned not through individual
choice but by the government.
Human rights can therefore only be actualized by a free market
system that encourages producers to produce goods and services that
they anticipate will be valued enough by other producers so that the
latter will sell their surplus labor to get what they want. Thus, for example, the right to work and the right to a paid vacation are not at all
impediments to international business. Rather, they call upon governments to provide the incentives to make international business work. If
multinational enterprise grows, more jobs will be created, and the right
to work will become actualizable.
HUMAN RIGHTS VS. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS

If the argument in the preceding section is correct, we can see that
the idea of human rights is a threat to collectivist theories such as
Marxism. Under Marxist theory two collectivities-the working class
and the capitalists-fight an inevitable war in which the capitalists are
ultimately destroyed.14 In the resulting single-class society, mass freedom can exist because the enemy has been removed. But history diverges from Marxist theory. Marx held that the government withers
away, but in fact the state must become increasingly powerful in order
to coerce those who are unwilling to do their share of the work. The
13 What ultimately counts is not the amount of after-tax dollars nor the rate of taxation, but
rather whether material incentives (such as TV sets) exist that can be purchased by a certain
amount of extra labor.
14 See K. MARX, DAS KAPITAL (1867), translatedin K. MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY (S. Moore and E. Aveling trans. 1906).
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slogan "from each according to his ability"' 5 means that the government must first determine the ability level, and second must enforce a
person's labor at that level. Workers may not be given material incentives for greater productivity without the risk that differential wealth
patterns will arise that lead to the reemergence of capitalists.
Indeed, communism requires that workers remain a homogenous
group. The logic of collectivism works toward individual equality in
fact, in contrast to human rights theory which works toward individual
equality under the law. Equality in legal rights means that the person
who chooses to work harder will reap greater material rewards than the
person who takes it easy (although the latter is certainly free to regard
non-work as a reward in itself). Differences in material wealth constitute the essence of free enterprise. Only in a system of such factual
differences are profit-making and profit-retention meaningful.
But history has also shown that when wealth differences are perceived to become intolerably great, a mass revolution will occur that
brings about sudden wealth redistribution. The free enterprise system
seems incapable of sufficient self-regulation to avoid such extreme differences in wealth; indeed, the internal motor of capitalism seems to
accelerate as profits increase, as attested by the "robber baron" legacy
of nineteenth century United States. To avoid revolution, capitalist societies have had to enact-often against the bitter opposition of the
business sector-wealth transfer payments in the form of progressive
taxation. Such redistribution of wealth through taxation saves the free
enterprise system against the excesses of its internal logic. In other
words, successful participants in the free enterprise system must submit
to taxation so that transfer payments may be made to unsuccessful participants, enabling the latter to have some of the material rewards of
the system (food, clothing, shelter, etc.). The human rights conventions
reach the same conclusion, although the focus is upon the recipients
rather than upon saving the free enterprise system. The general duty to
provide each person with food, clothing, shelter, etc., necessarily calls
for a taxation system that results in transfer payments to the poor.
However, one might well ask what is special about taxation? If
taxation becomes too onerous, is it any different from communism?
Doesn't taxation involve coercion? My reply is that taxation might
very well become onerous if we view it as an end in itself. But if we
adopt the perspective of the human rights conventions, we see that
what is substantively essential is not taxation per se but rather maxi15 KONSTITUTSA (OSNOVI ZAKON) SOIUlZA SOVIETSKIK

SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK

(CoNsTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS) art. 14.
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mizing transfer payments so that everyone may receive the basic neces-

sities of life and have a stake in the system. Yet as soon as we focus
upon maximization of transfer payments-and hence maximization of
tax revenues-a limiting mechanism naturally occurs. If the level of
taxation is pushed too high, disincentives to produce will result, and tax
revenue decreases. To illustrate, an increase in the level of taxation
from ten to twenty percent might very well increase tax revenues, but

an increase from seventy to eighty percent might decrease total revenues. 16 At the higher levels, non-work becomes marginally preferable
to work since it is marginally worth so little in after-tax money to do
the extra work. By fine-tuning the taxation rates to maximize revenues

over a long period of time, governments will be furthering the cause of
human rights and, incidentally, removing the preconditions for socialist
revolution.t 7 Concomitantly, the government is not coercing labor. A
tax on income can be avoided if a person chooses not to work at all. By
setting a tax rate such that enough people have an incentive to produce
even if their income is taxed at that rate, individual choices whether to
work or not to work will in fact determine the tax level. It would be
distorting language to call this kind of taxation "coercive"; in fact, it is
fully consistent with, if not required by, a theory of universal human
rights.
HUMAN RIGHTS VS. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

If there is something antithetical between human rights and collec-

tivism, may there not also be a clash between human rights and national prerogatives? Third-world rhetoric would have us believe that
16 The "Laffer curve" illustrates this phenomenon of taxation. At either extreme--7o%or 100%
of income--the government will realize no tax revenues. Somewhere in between revenues will be
maximized. Of course, governments often take a long time to realize that high tax rates are operating as a disincentive to work and production since the immediate effect of a tax increase is
usually to increase revenue (in the short run) until more people and industries realize that extra
work doesn't "pay."
17 Perhaps the twentieth century's most important contribution to the analysis of social justice,
J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), reaches the same result through a posited mechanism of
disinterested individuals bargaining among themselves for the optimal distribution of societal
wealth. In that scheme, Rawls sets up transfer payments from the most advantaged members of
society to the most disadvantaged, but only to the point at which the latter do not become marginally worse off because of production disincentives upon those who are taxed leading to an aggregate decline in the benefits received by the disadvantaged. However, the result of the disinterested
bargaining is to create a just society, a result coincident with the human rights thesis. Interestingly, before he gets to the redistribution scheme, Rawls requires that a just society foster the
maximum liberty of each individual consistent with aggregate liberty. In this manner, his result
accords with that reached in the second section of the present article, in that coerced labor would
violate the "liberty" principle.
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there is no such clash. The language of the previously cited Cocoyoc
Declaration shifts ambiguously between rich nations and rich individuals, and between poor nations and poor persons. In talking about "reliance primarily upon one's own resources,"' 18 the Declaration does not
make clear whether "one" is a third-world nation or an individual laborer, although it mentions in the same context the need for "increased
national self-reliance."' 19 The document calls upon the powerful nations to keep "hands off" third-world countries, to allow them to "find
their own road to a fuller life for their citizens. ' 20 In affirming the idea
of national sovereignty over natural resources, the Declaration aligns
itself with earlier United Nations resolutions on "permanent sovereignty" over natural resources. 2 ' In these positions, the Declaration is
typical of claims that are heard daily. Industrialized nations are admonished for having "exploited" the natural resources of third-world
nations, such as the oil in Iran or the copper in Chile. The United
States is blamed for consuming a disproportionate amount per capita
of the world's natural resources.
Yet if the industrialized nations feel any "guilt" over such charges,
their feelings may be traced to the success of the propaganda in mixing
the human rights moral issue with the claims of national sovereignty.
For, in the first place, nations such as the United States have paid for
the natural resources that they have imported from the third-world. If
third-world countries had a better use for them than selling them to the
industrialized nations, they should have kept them. But in fact the
minerals in the ground were of little use to the developing nations, and
therefore the decision was made to sell them at the going market price.
If as a result the people of many of those nations remain poor, their
poverty is not the fault of the buyers of their mineral wealth, for without such buyers they would be even poorer. Perhaps for this reason the
sales of such minerals continue today despite the rhetoric.
Secondly, we might ask by what human right do the people in
mineral-rich areas claim ownership of those mineral resources. If we
can sort out claims of national sovereignty over natural resources from
human rights claims, we find that the two are entirely different from
each other. As a matter of human rights, we certainly should give a
worker the product of his labor consistent with the claims of others to
18 BEYOND DEPENDENCY, supra note 5, at 174.
19 Id.

20 Id.
21 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 803, 17 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States, art. 2, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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some portion of that labor. But why should we assign to any person or
group of persons the vast wealth that by an accident of nature happens
to be located within the physical territory that they claim is a nation?
From a human rights standpoint, it would be far more defensible to
allocate all underground mineral wealth to every human being regardless of the location of that wealth. It should be a matter of common
ownership available to all, like the high seas in international law. Of
course, a person who extracts mineral wealth has commingled her labor
with the minerals, and is entitled to some portion of the worth of the
extraction. But she should receive no more than the market price for
such labor, which would be fixed by open competition for the job. Any
proceeds above that amount should be distributed to the people of the
world in the priority given by the human right conventions-food first,
then clothing, shelter, and so forth.
Yet we await in vain any statement by a mineral-rich third-world
nation that its underground wealth should be distributed to poor persons in foreign countries. Instead, we receive rhetoric that subtly
22
blends human rights with national sovereignty claims of right.
Generalizing the preceding argument, I would contend that a universal system of human rights would tend toward the dissolution of al
national claims to special rights or privileges of the citizenry. For a
nation, upon analysis, is a collectivity. Its boundaries are artificial, for
the purposes of universal human rights. To the extent that human
rights makes any inroad at all into national sovereignty claims, the effect will be to protect international business against expropriation or
confiscation. In this respect, there is a fundamental affinity between the
goals of multinational business enterprise and the goals of human
rights.

22 Although certainly not third-world rhetoric, J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) much
more subtly involves the same confusion between social rights and the boundaries of nations.
Professor Rawls' goal is to work out a justice system for a given society. But there are significant
conceptual problems in relating a society patterned on his model with other nations of the world,
particularly poor nations. For further analysis of this point, see D'Amato, InternationalLaw and
Rawls' Theory ofJustice 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 525 (1975).

